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Background: Typologies traditionally used for international comparisons of health systems often conflate many
system characteristics. To capture policy changes over time and by service in health systems regulation of public
and private insurance, we propose a database containing explicit, standardized indicators of policy instruments.
Methods: The Health Insurance Access Database (HIAD) will collect policy information for ten OECD countries, over
a range of eight health services, from 1990–2010. Policy indicators were selected through a comprehensive
literature review which identified policy instruments most likely to constitute barriers to health insurance, thus
potentially posing a threat to equity. As data collection is still underway, we present here the theoretical bases and
methodology adopted, with a focus on the rationale underpinning the study instruments.
Results: These harmonized data will allow the capture of policy changes in health systems regulation of public and
private insurance over time and by service. The standardization process will permit international comparisons of
systems’ performance with regards to health insurance access and equity.
Conclusion: This research will inform and feed the current debate on the future of health care in developed
countries and on the role of the private sector in these changes.Introduction
In 2008, the WHO Commission on Social Determinants
of Health published its landmark report stating that “in-
equities are killing people on a ‘grand scale’” [1]. Among
the report’s recommendations for action, improving access
to (public, universal) health insurance looms large, and not
only in developing countries. Indeed, over the past decade,
health spending in many developed countries has grown
faster than gross domestic product, leading governments
to search for alternative financing structures, notably
through increased private expenditures [2].
However, some of the policy instruments used to reach
those goals, such as restricting eligibility criteria for public
insurance and increasing reliance on unregulated private
health insurance (PHI) or cost sharing arrangements, may* Correspondence: amelie.quesnelvallee@mcgill.ca
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumin fact have had the unexpected effect of erecting supple-
mentary barriers to health insurance coverage. Moreover,
as the impact of these policies is generally not randomly
distributed in the population, these transformations have
raised concerns about their effects on both population
health and social inequalities in health.
For instance, in Figure 1 we present data on PHI and
household out-of-pocket (OOP) spending as a proportion
of total expenditures on health (TEH) among the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries. The data are ranked by increasing proportion of
PHI spending, and clearly illustrate that the proportion of
OOP spending does not follow a similar upward trend.
Thus, increased OOP does not necessarily follow from
greater reliance on PHI. As such, we can postulate that cer-
tain countries are better able to limit financial barriers to
health insurance coverage, which could occur notably be-
cause of more generous public programs, and/or through
greater governmental regulation of the private insurance
industry.Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
Figure 1 Private health insurance spending and household Out-of-pocket payments, both as % of Total expenditures on health (TEH),
OECD Countries, 2005. Note: Countries are rank-ordered from left to right by private health insurance as a proportion of THE. Only countries with
complete data are shown (Chile, Greece, Iceland, Norway, Slovak Republic, and Turkey omitted because of missing data on either or both
variables).
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Health Insurance Access Database (HIAD) which assembles
indicators pertaining to the interplay of public and PHI
coverage and regulation. This will be achieved by extracting
policy information on a set of coverage and regulation indi-
cators in ten OECD countries, for a range of eight health
services, from 1990–2010. These data will allow for the cap-
ture of policy changes over time and by service in the way
health systems regulate public and private insurance. One
distinguishing feature of our approach, which contrasts
starkly with previous research, is a focus on the explicit and
detailed measurement of policy instruments, rather than a
broad typology assessment of health systems organization,
as done by Roemer for instance [3,4] or the functions of
PHI, as proposed by Colombo and Tapay [2]. As data col-
lection is still underway, we present here the theoretical
bases and methodology adopted, with a focus on the ra-
tionale underpinning the study instruments.
Background
Much research has been devoted to demonstrating that
health systems can improve population health. To wit,
McWilliams’ [5] review of the clinical and economic litera-
ture indicates that extended health insurance coverage has
indeed helped improve population health across a range of
outcomes. His review, however, along with much of the re-
search in this area, does not speak to any changes in the
gap of relative inequity between the health of individuals
across socioeconomic status [6-8].
In contrast, our project aims to highlight how broader,
more generous and universal health insurance coveragecan help narrow or widen socioeconomic gaps in health
over time, often whilst improving the general health of
the population [9-13]. In fact, the question of the contri-
bution of health insurance to socioeconomic inequalities
in health has received a fair amount of – mostly negative
– attention since the advent of national health service
systems (and particularly the British National Health Service
in 1948). As it was widely assumed that social inequalities
in health stemmed from unequal utilization of modern
medical care, the most obvious solution to reducing these
inequalities appeared to be the elimination of unequal ac-
cess to medical services stemming from non-need factors –
inequities, in short [14]. As such, universal health insurance
and, in certain cases, universal health care systems, were the
prime ways through which societies hoped to mitigate the
effects of social inequalities on health [15].
Many have since argued that neither universal health
coverage nor universal health care systems are sufficient
for eliminating socioeconomic inequities in mortality.
However, a closer examination reveals that this persistence
of health inequalities is in fact often due in part to the
most advantaged group taking advantage of innovations
faster [16], as well as because PHI and out-of-pocket pay-
ments that are not randomly distributed in the population
tend to exist alongside a public system [17-21].
Natural experiments: Historical changes in public health
insurance coverage
Most evidence comes from studies that relied upon natural
experiments provided by historical changes in public health
insurance coverage. One study was seminal in refining the
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insurance in the UK had not curtailed social inequities in
health. In a cross-national and longitudinal comparison of
the U.K. and the Netherlands, Mackenbach, Stronks and
Kunst [22] showed that the widening of socioeconomic
inequities in mortality between 1930 and 1980 in the
U.K. was partly due to medically amenable conditions,
thus suggesting that differential access to care between
socioeconomic groups may have contributed to rising
socioeconomic inequities in mortality. Similar findings
were reported in British Columbia, Canada [20]. More
recently, a natural experiment following the introduction
of universal health insurance in Taiwan found that life ex-
pectancy improved more among those in the lower classes,
resulting in a narrowing of health disparities [13].
Similarly, studies that made use of the Canadian ex-
perience in developing a one-payer public system found
that access to care and care of the poor both increased
substantially after the introduction of national health in-
surance [23,24]. Moreover, it appears that this increase
in access also translated in improved health outcomes:
the introduction of national insurance was associated
with a 4% decline in infant mortality, coupled with a de-
crease in the incidence of low birth weight that was par-
ticularly marked among single parents [25].
PHI and out-of-pocket spending
An alternative perspective to these studies has been the
examination of PHI and out-of-pocket spending. Longi-
tudinal and cross-sectional studies of the effects of
health insurance demonstrate a clear link between PHI
coverage – especially when it is continuous – and more
timely and appropriate access to care, better self-rated
health and lower mortality amongst the insured [26-33].
More specifically, as they are generally unable to afford
either private insurance premiums or out-of-pocket med-
ical costs, uninsured Americans receive fewer services
and have lower utilization rates than insured individuals
[31,34]. Moreover, the length of time uninsured is also
associated with increasing barriers to access to care [35].
Differential access to services and social inequalities in
health
Many studies have found that the likelihood of experiencing
unmet health care needs is higher among people without
health insurance [36-38]. Moreover, the lack of insurance
also increases the probability of stating that these needs
were unmet because of cost [26,36]. Both of these mechan-
isms could contribute to health inequalities, by increasing
financial strain and decreasing access among lower SES
individuals.
Recent research has also begun to focus on processes
contributing to social inequalities in health by favoring
the more socio-economically advantaged. This couldoccur for instance in mixed systems, where privately
insured individuals may get access to higher quality ser-
vices than their publicly or uninsured counterparts. In
his overview of the literature, Bach [39] concludes that
the poor are disproportionately affected by lower quality
surgical care and that the gaps in quality of service
experienced by different socioeconomic groups are suffi-
cient to explain the overall gap in health between these
patients. In their studies of the relationship between
quality primary health care and health outcomes, Shi
and colleagues [40] conclude that good primary care is
not only associated with improved health, but with
diminished inequities in health status between socioeco-
nomic groups. Similarly, others found that higher quality
primary health care was associated with reduced racial and
ethnic disparities in both general and mental health status
[41]. As such, these studies, which examine specific health
services, suggest the need for a service-specific approach
within a framework of social inequalities in health.
Implications of the literature review for future research
This review indicates that, compared to public insurance,
PHI and out-of-pocket spending may contribute to
socioeconomic differentials in health by compounding
the positive effects of income on health [26,28,42-44]. In
contrast, mandatory coverage through public means
should mitigate socioeconomic differentials in health as
it will remove one pathway where income may impact
on health [11-13,41,45]. Finally, more recent research
indicates that a service-specific approach is necessary to
uncover these fine-grained associations. Thus, the sub-
stantive conclusion we reach is that the mix of public
coverage, private insurance, and out-of-pocket spending,
especially when assessed in a service-specific perspective,
can indeed potentially affect health inequalities.
Methodologically, we can also gain some directions for
future research. Indeed, this review indicates that studies
have rarely contrasted the experience of more than two
countries, particularly in a service-specific approach. Fi-
nally, when studies contrast larger groups of countries,
and/or over longer periods of time, they often have to
make assumptions regarding the policy context that may
have affected population health or health inequalities
[46]. These considerations highlight the timeliness and
highly innovative nature of the project we propose here,
which will allow us to examine multiple countries and
services over time using explicit, standardized measure-
ments of policies regarding public coverage and PHI
regulation.
Development of the data collection instrument:
Operational definitions
Our conceptual starting point was a taxonomy of the
interplay between public and PHI proposed by the
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insurance arrangements should be classified according to
the following four criteria: Sources of financing for pub-
lic or private health insurance; Level of compulsion:
mandatory or voluntary health insurance; Group or indi-
vidual schemes; Method of premium calculation.
Given the large number of policy instruments that fall
under this classification scheme, we restricted our data
collection to those most pertinent to our object, namely
those that increase barriers to health insurance coverage
and have the most potential for impacting health and
health inequalities.Scoping literature review
Consequently, for each of the elements highlighted by
the taxonomy, we conducted a scoping literature review
to assess the published evidence regarding these insurance
characteristics and their impact on both population health
and health inequalities [48]. Using key electronic data-
bases, we relied on combinations of the terms indicated in
Table 1. Refined searches were performed by imposing
restrictions such as geographic location (to OECD coun-
tries) and type of article (original or review). Finally, for
each article that was selected, we examined its bibliog-
raphy as well as later articles in which it is cited.
In many cases, we found only indirect evidence con-
cerning the mechanisms through which these factors
could have a plausible impact on population health and/
or health inequalities. This was the case for instance
when studies indicated that access to health care was
limited, or that certain policy configurations tended to
lead to loss of coverage. We nevertheless included those
indicators in our data collection instrument, as we saw
this dearth of direct effects on population health or
health inequalities as indicative of a knowledge gap in
the literature.Data collection instrument
The policy instruments we focus on below were therefore
those whose variation in implementation was shown or
suggestive to be the most significant for population health
and health inequalities. In certain cases, the broad OECD
criteria had to be refined further to better reflect the range
of policy instruments that we are aiming to measure here
(notably to facilitate data capture by the data editors). This
was the case, for instance, with the category “Sources of fi-
nancing for public or private health insurance”, where we
focused on private co-payments within public insurance
and on sources of financing for PHI.
In Table 2 we summarize the main categories of interest
in the data collection instrument, provide a brief rationale
for focusing on these areas of interest, and list select studies
that document their potential impact on population healthand health inequalities. In Figure 2, we present the policy
indicators that we extract through this research process.
As highlighted in Table 2, the first section of the data
collection instrument focuses on public health insurance.
The main questions deal with barriers to enrolment, in-
cluding eligibility requirements, and with the extent of
out-of-pocket payments. Our instrument explicitly
attempts to document the extent to which these groups
are protected from these expenses. We will also use the
measures of out-of-pocket expenses provided by the
OECD Health Data to supplement this indicator. The
second section relates to PHI and private expenditures on
health. A primary objective of this section is to qualify the
existence of a PHI market and the extent of governmental
regulation on both PHI and private expenditures on health
more generally. In the last section, we seek to document the
general mechanisms and the interplay of public and PHI
in ensuring health insurance coverage of the population.
The ‘type of coverage’ section was not part of the litera-
ture review because of the lack of internationally com-
parable studies conducted at this level – this is exactly
one of the lacunae that will be addressed by our project.
Our preliminary results have already found evidence of
other coverage types in addition those initially men-
tioned by the OECD [2], such as, for instance, “comple-
mentary public health insurance”, which occurs when
public health insurance covers the co-payments from
PHI (an incentive that may be used by governments to
increase PHI uptake).
List of services
We drew a list of medically necessary services, using the
OECD Health Data [83] as a starting point. This
harmonization of the services considered in the OECD
database will allow us to use these data to provide the
country-level quantitative context for the qualitative policy
data we are collecting. However, we also found it necessary
to go beyond and encompass a broader range of medic-
ally-necessary services. Services that we added to the
OECD list are indicated by an asterisk: General practi-
tioner services; Specialist physician services (except den-
tists and optometry) outside hospital*; Preventive and
restorative outpatient dental care services; In-patient care;
Long term care; Mental health*; Prescription drugs; and
Diagnostic exams and Screening.
List of countries
This project focuses on developed, OECD countries for
two reasons: 1. We rely on the OECD Health Data to
quantify some of our more qualitative indicators; 2.
Many analysts suggest that there is often a large discrep-
ancy between health service legislation and its imple-
mentation in developing countries, which would bias our
quantitative results towards the null [84].
Table 1 Search terms for the scoping literature review using Web of Science and Medline
Primary search term Outcome Restriction 1 Focus on the data collection instrument
• Cover* or insur* or uninsured • Health Privat* • Mandat*
• Insurance coverage • inequal* OR access* OR qualit* • Deductible
• Criteri* AND (enrol* OR eligab*)
• Citizen* OR residen* OR immig*
• Income OR age-based
• Welfare
• Child*
• Elderly OR seniors OR age-based
• Disab*
• Chronic condition/chronic disease
• insur* OR cover* OR uninsured
• individual health insurance OR employer
health insurance OR community rated
premium OR individual risk insurance


















• Regulat* OR enrol* OR risk adjustment OR
cream skimming
•renew* or lifetime cover* or fee
Notes: These search terms were used in combinations of the four columns above, with the Boolean term AND. General inclusion criteria: Article type: Article and
review; Language: English; Countries excluded: South Africa, Zimbabwe, Cambodia, Ghana, Kenya, Nepal, Pakistan, Tanzania, Vietnam, Slovakia, Qatar, Peru,
Malaysia, Madagascar, Lebanon, Indonesia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Nigeria, Bahamas, Czech Republic, Ghana, India, Iran, Kenya.
Analytic inclusion criteria: 1) Deal with one of the topics of the question; 2) Outcome examined: inequality, access, quality, health outcomes; 3) If however, there were lack
of studies on examining the outcomes, then coverage used as an outcome. Analytic exclusion criteria: 1) policy papers; 2) commentary; 3) proposals on how to fix the system.
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Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States. These
countries were selected to provide a range of variation
(and thus to allow for contrasts) with regards to Esping
Andersen’s Welfare Regime classification (Liberal, Social
Democratic, Conservative) [85], Roemer’s type of health
system (comprehensive, welfare oriented, entrepreneurial)[3,4] and the OECD’s typology of the role of PHI within
that system (primary, primary substitutive, supplementary,
duplicative or complementary) [2]. Figure 3 illustrates the
position of countries within these different typologies, and
the types of PHI that exist in these countries. A first obser-
vation is that there is some variation in the type of health
system within each welfare regime (across rows), and that
there also exists a variety of types of PHI within each type
Table 2 Main HIAD indicators and their potential impact on population health and health inequalities




Enrolment Automatic enrolment in public insurance reduces non-
financial barriers to coverage (such as time-consuming,
hard to understand paperwork or lack of awareness of
eligibility) and increases participation rates
[49,50]
Renewal The need for frequent (annually or less), active (i.e.
needing action from the insuree) renewal increases the
likelihood of losing coverage
[51-54]
Cost-sharing (out-of-pocket expenses) Greater cost-sharing leads to decreases in service use [55-58]
Drug use appears particularly sensitive to this, as are
economically vulnerable individuals and those with
chronic diseases
[59-70].
Private health insurance and private expenditures on health
Legality of private insurance for this service A measure of the public prohibition of a parallel private
(insurance and provision) market (see duplicative
insurance below).
[2]
Minimum level of coverage mandated by law The evidence suggests that a minimum coverage
mandate (such as mental health parity) increases
equitable access to services
[71]
Source of financing Greater reliance on (unregulated) individually risk-rated
insurance decreases coverage and access, but this may
vary by service
[72-74]
Tax funded subsidies Have a positive effect on coverage, though this may
vary by service
[75,76].
Enrolment Lack of regulation surrounding enrollment practices
poses significant threats to coverage and access to
health services
[77,78]
Renewal Lifetime coverage ensures the highest levels of
coverage. Low levels of public regulation increase the
likelihood of lost coverage and limited access
[52,79,80]
General mechanisms
Type of coverage (1) Aside from strictly public coverage, most countries




(2) A duplicate of public insurance, providing a
private alternative for services already covered under
the public system.
(3) A complement or top-up for services already
covered under the public system, as in France; (4) A
supplement to public insurance for services uninsured
under the public system, as in Canada;
(5) A substitute to public insurance (e.g. for those
with high incomes in Germany who can opt-out);
(6) A primary source of health insurance, as in the
U.S.Our preliminary results have already found evidence
of other coverage types in addition to these
Level of compulsion for health insurance Mandated insurance improves access to services, but
may not decrease health inequalities, unless it
constitutes a mandate for public health insurance
[81,82]
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trast Panel A and Panel B, we can see that the position of
each country with regards to PHI (from less reliance inpaler blue to greater reliance in dark blue) does not neces-
sarily coincide with the proportion of OOP. Finally, the
relative position of countries even within a given Welfare
Figure 3 Countries selected for analysis, by Welfare Regime and Heal
health due to private insurance funding (Panel A) and to out-of pocke
Except for Denmark and the Netherlands, for which the most recent data a
regimes are based on Esping Andersen’s typology [85]. Health systems clas
the Colombo and Tapay OECD typology [2], and includes Primary (P), Prima
Duplicative (D). Please note that some configurations of Welfare State and
Social Democratic and Entrepreneurial. Finally, the Netherlands is a mixed s
other categories, but we are relying on Esping Andersen’s and Roemer’s ca
Figure 2 Main policy indicators collected in the HIAD.
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regards to the proportion of spending due to PHI or OOP:
for instance of the Netherlands and Australia, where the
former has a higher proportion of PHI than Australia, but
a lower proportion of OOP.
Reference period (1990–2010)
In order to track the recent evolution of health policies
in many health care systems, we will be focusing on the
reference years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010. These
periods have seen frequent policy reforms with a high
potential for affecting the coverage structure of health
services in developed countries. On the basis of currently
available evidence, we have deemed this sufficient in
terms of periodicity. However, we also capture the
detailed evolution over time (based on major reforms) of
policy changes regarding eligibility for public coverage
and exemptions from the out-of-pocket expenses asso-
ciated with public coverage. Future reforms will be sub-
sequently updated every following 5-year period for as
long as possible.th Systems typology by proportion of the Total expenditures on
t payments (Panel B), and with the type of PHI in parentheses.a.
vailable were in 2005. Data extracted from OECD.Stat. Notes: Welfare
sification is based on Roemer’s typology [3,4]. Type of PHI is based on
ry substitute (Ps), Supplementary (S), Complementary (C), and
Health Systems typologies result in empty cells, such as for instance
ystem in many ways, and it may also be argued that it belongs in
tegorization of this country.
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In order to collect policy data along the dimensions we
defined above, a systematic search is conducted by two
data editors per case (where a case consists of a jurisdic-
tion, a health service, and spans the entire time period of
analysis) to find all relevant information using primary and
secondary sources of information. We have developed a
data collection instrument that standardizes the process to
limit individual variations in interpretation and coding as
much as possible. This standardized coding process is
achieved through a thorough initial training and workflow
management. This workflow is illustrated in Figure 4,
which shows that each complete case takes at about 40
person-hours (this estimate does not include the time
spent by the quality controller and the project manager in
providing feedback respectively between steps 1 and 2 and
steps 2 and 3, or the time spent by the project manager in
reconciling data sheets after the reconciliation meeting).
In addition, we have trained our research team to follow
the following systematic and standardized data collection
process: the first citation should be a secondary source,
ideally from a peer-reviewed journal, found through aca-
demic databases using a combination of MeSH terms and
keywords such as those shown in Table 1. The importance
of this recommendation is that this first citation should
allow the data editor to narrow down the policy docu-
ments or periods that they should search for in the second
citation.
The second citation should be a primary policy source,
which, if recent, can often be found on websites of the
countries’ Ministries of Health or health agencies. Alterna-
tively, websites of international organizations as well as na-
tional legislative databases will be consulted, such as the
WHO International Digest of Health Legislation (IDHL),
The World Legal Information Institute (WorldLII), or the
Foreign Law Guide (FLG).
This double citation strategy and the depth of the
search for the second citation are particularly important
for PHI regulation categories. Indeed, it is extremely
challenging to prove the absence of a policy. We will
therefore ensure that all necessary steps were taken to
document this policy before we can affirm with any de-
gree of certainty that there is no regulation. We describe
in greater detail in the limitations section how we will
code this information.Figure 4 Workflow process for the individual data editors reviews.In addition to the main categorical response collected to
qualify each indicator, detailed information is also recorded
during the process, in a comments section or standardized
research log within the data collection instrument. This
“qualitative” information will be crucial to better under-
standing the evolution of service coverage over time and
will be used for developing fine-grained categories and in-
creasing the discriminatory power between years and/or
countries.
Data validation
The extraction, coding and standardization of policy infor-
mation are delicate processes that require the implementa-
tion of careful strategies to ensure data validity and
reliability [86,87]. Triangulation is used in order to verify
the validity, consistency and accuracy of the results. As
mentioned earlier, at least two citations are needed to justify
every single item response. Moreover, in order to improve
data reliability and avoid capture error or misinterpretation,
we use a double rating or inter-rater reliability process: each
country/service/time period is assessed by two different
data editors independently. In addition, to avoid a system-
atic bias in data editor pairs, we regularly rotate the data
editor dyad configurations.
Data editors must send in their work before a team
meeting, and the project manager collates the information,
highlighting any discordant information or discrepancies
between raters. In the event of such problems, we discuss
these issues as a team, and attempt to resolve disagree-
ments. In the course of these discussions, priority is given
to primary policy sources. In our experience so far (with 4
health services across the 10 Canadian provinces), these
issues arose primarily because of the data collection instru-
ment, and we refined it accordingly, with the consequence
being that now, our raters are reaching very high levels of
inter-rater reliability.
Building and testing the HIAD
Information is currently being gathered in Microsoft
Excel spreadsheets. This constitutes our raw data collec-
tion. In order to produce a database that will be func-
tional for both qualitative and quantitative data analysis,
these data are then automatically extracted from Excel
into a Microsoft Access database. This database records
data on all the indicators listed above, in a three-
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jurisdiction, and for each service. Once validated, the Ac-
cess database can easily be used to guide the descriptive
trend analysis. It is also transferrable into a statistical
software for linkage to individual-level micro-data.
Sharing the HIAD
We have designed the HIAD to be open-access and will
make the completed and validated cases available upon re-
quest. Please see our website (bit.ly/HIADaccess) for more
information. In addition, we are currently examining
options for online publishing that would allow for the de-
scriptive analysis of the policy data along the dimensions of
jurisdictions, time and health services.
In sum, the development of HIAD will allow for analyses
along the following dimensions: within and across coun-
tries; within and across services; and within and across
time periods. On that basis, there will then be countless
possible combinations of these analytic dimensions, such
as 1) Examining the evolution of insurance regulation of a
specific service across OECD countries over several time
periods; or conversely, 2) Studying how a specific country
regulates the entire range of services at a specific point in
time. Finally, we are building the HIAD in a way that will
eventually allow for linkages with individual micro-data, in
order to empirically test the effects of these different con-
figurations of health services on inequalities of access and
health.
Limitations and sensitivity analyses
Level of analysis
Health policy is enacted at many different levels (country;
subnational; local or municipal), and the extent of this ex-
ecutive integration varies substantially between countries
and notably as a function of the type of political system
in place [88]. We therefore had to choose the most ap-
propriate level of analysis for the database. Except for
Canada (for which we are currently collecting data at
the provincial level), we selected the broadest (country)
level. While this broad level of analysis constitutes a po-
tential limitation of our approach by not capturing more
fine-grained local policies, we argue that it still provides
a sense of the context in which these more local policies
are being enacted, and plausibly sets the range, if not the
minimal standard, for these policies.
Documenting the lack of policy regulation
As we have outlined above, the careful documentation and
coding of existing policies is a delicate process. This en-
deavour becomes even more challenging when we are
trying to document the absence of regulation, as the bur-
den of proof rests upon a lack of evidence. To address
this issue, which is particularly pressing with PHI regu-
lation (or lack thereof ), we have developed a strictprotocol that delineates the types of sources to query, in
which order, for how long, and which response to record
in the database at the end of the search.
Our data editors have been instructed to only select
the “no regulation” category when they find two citations
that explicitly state independently (i.e. without referen-
cing each other) that there is no public regulation of PHI
for this service. This is the only case where the two cita-
tions documenting our indicator can be from secondary
sources (as it is unlikely that a governmental document
would explicitly state that there is a lack of policy).
However, this stringent criterion is difficult to meet in
most cases lacking regulation. Thus, barring these two
citations, and when faced with a potential lack of regula-
tion for PHI, the data editors are then instructed to
search through all the sources described in the HIAD
data collection strategy section above. If, after querying
these sources, regulation is still lacking, this case is
flagged as “no regulation found”.
Legislation and implementation
While we could argue that it is a necessary step towards
regulation, the existence of legislation does not guarantee:
1. That it will be implemented; 2. That this will be done in
a timely manner; 3. That it will be respected (and enforced
in cases of violation). Thus, while this project constitutes a
step forward by systematically indexing the presence of
policy and regulations (in contrast with a broad
categorization of the system into certain health sys-
tems typologies), we still need to establish the validity
of this approach with regards to the conditions above.
The periodicity of observation that we selected (every
5 years) responds in part to the second issue. Indeed, we
expect that there will be a certain lag between the time
legislation is passed and its implementation. In this con-
text, we expect that five years constitutes a reasonable
lag to observe the effects of a policy change.
In addition, we will perform qualitative sensitivity ana-
lyses in order to test whether the legislation we have
identified meets the three conditions above. As a valid-
ation study, we will therefore perform an in-depth exam-
ination of these criteria for 3 policy changes having
occurred between 1990–2005. Here, 1990 will serve as a
baseline, and we will end in 2005 to ensure a sufficient
lag post-legislation to observe implementation – or lack
thereof.
Cases will be selected through random draw in a se-
quential process from the following samples:
1. All the cases of policy change in our database for the
year 1995;
2. All the cases of policy change for the year 2000,
excluding those coming from the same jurisdiction
or for the same service as case 1;
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excluding those from jurisdictions and services from
cases 1 and 2;
The stratification of samples by year is to ensure that we
are observing different waves of policy change (as there
tends to be diffusion of these changes from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, and “generations” of policy changes). The ex-
clusion criteria for cases 2 and 3 similarly work to ensure
that our results are not biased either by a particular political
context that is more or less favourable to policy change, or
by policy change for certain services where implementation
may meet varying degrees of resistance, depending on the
stakeholders involved (i.e. health professionals, insurance
companies, etc.) and their endorsement of the policy
change.
Conclusion
This project will develop a new database standardizing the
documentation of policy instruments that will provide
much-needed descriptive information on the evolution
and extent of public coverage and private health insurance
regulation for different health services, and across many
countries and time periods.
In addition to this policy analysis, the database is
developed to allow for linkage with individual-level
micro-data, thus setting the stage for empirical analyses
of the impact of the mix of public and private health in-
surance on social inequalities in health and access to
care. This should lead to the identification of policy-
amenable contributors to health inequalities. For in-
stance, HIAD indicators could be linked to household
panel surveys (where multiple individuals from a single
household are interviewed and followed over time),
which would set allow for multilevel analysis at three
levels of information: individual, household and country-
levels. As such, contextual effect of health systems could
be assessed with mixed effects models while issues of
health and socioeconomic selection into health insurance
coverage could be assessed with within-individual, within-
family and within-country fixed effects models. Alterna-
tively, HIAD indicators pointing to a policy change could
be used with aggregate, macro data in interrupted time-
series analyses to estimate the longitudinal effects of an
intervention in a quasi-experimental design.
Furthermore, our open access policy with regards to
sharing the HIAD data will ensure that these data are
widely disseminated and used by researchers and key sta-
keholders. In doing so, we hope to inform and feed the
current debate on the future of health care and the role
of the private sector in these changes. As such, this re-
search should lead to the development of evidence-based
health care policies which are better able to protect
population health and equity.Competing interests
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